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Abstract—As a car becomes more connected, a countermeasure
against automobile theft has become a significant task in the real
world. To respond to automobile theft, data mining, biometrics,
and additional authentication methods are proposed. Among cur-
rent countermeasures, data mining method is one of the efficient
ways to capture the owner driver’s unique characteristics. To
identify the owner driver from thieves, previous works applied
various algorithms toward driving data.
Such data mining methods utilized supervised learning, thus
required labeled data set. However, it is unrealistic to gather and
apply the thief’s driving pattern. To overcome this problem, we
propose driver identification method with GAN. GAN has merit
to build identification model by learning the owner driver’s data
only. We trained GAN only with owner driver’s data and used
trained discriminator to identify the owner driver. From actual
driving data, we evaluated our identification model recognizes the
owner driver well. By ensembling various driver authentication
methods with the proposed model, we expect industry can develop
automobile theft countermeasures available in the real world.
Index Terms—Automobile Theft, Driver Identification, GAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the development of technology, the number of
computing devices inside a vehicle increased. As representa-
tives, Controller Area Network (CAN) and Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) enable communication within a car, In-vehicle
Infotainment (IVI) lets the driver to enjoy various contents, and
sensors such as camera, LiDAR, and RADAR make the driving
environment safer. Although the purpose of computing devices
varies, the entire car system is oriented to enhance communi-
cation around the vehicle. On the other hand, threats emerged
in communication-related aspects accompanying automobile
theft. Following past researches, more communication around
the car generates more threats to the automobile system [1].
Nowadays, enormous investment and research effort started
to focus on Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication and
autonomous driving, thus cars become more connected. These
approaches promote benefits but create security concerns
related to automobile theft at the same time. If past car
thieves physically broke windows for theft, modern thieves
would perform cyber attacks toward the car. In July 2015,
Reuters reported a former U.S National Security Agency
hacker Charlie Miller and IOActive researcher Chris Valasek
used a feature in the Fiat Chrysler telematics system to break
into the car running on a highway. Miller and Valasek turned
on the Jeep Cherokees radio and activated other inessential
devices [2]. In the era of V2X communication and autonomous
driving, automobile thefts do not simply occur by physical
access, but also occur from threats at cyber world. Therefore,
automobile theft countermeasure at both real world and cyber
world is highly required.
Recently, several countermeasures against automobile theft
were proposed. For example, researchers suggested biometrics
methods based on image processing with face, fingerprint,
and iris or signal processing method for speech recognition
[3]. However, car manufacturers had to jump over hurdles
for implementation: hardness of achieving high accuracy, in-
consistent performance, inconvenience of installing additional
hardware, which results in inefficiency [4]. To overcome
shortcomings of the biometrics, data mining method appeared
on the stage. Data mining method captures the pattern of
the owner driver, and compare newly recognized data with
the owner driver’s data. When people drive through the road,
all drivers have different driving styles. For example, some
drivers accelerate as fast as they can while others smoothly
accelerate. Some drivers push the brake pedal multiple times,
while others make a sudden stop. By utilizing these different
driving patterns, numerous researches introduced data mining
methods for driver identification.
However, past data mining methods have a limit to be
utilized as automobile theft countermeasure. Previous data
mining methods require well-labeled data set for the owner
driver and thieves. But it is hard to collect or even predict
automobile thief data; thus, it is impossible to train the model.
Moreover, collecting data from a car becomes a resource-
consuming task when it goes on a large scale, and the privacy
issue exists in the data collection process. Data related to
driving habits can be classified as private information, and
car manufacturers might have a hurdle to collect for training
[5].
In this work, we developed automobile theft countermea-
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sure with driver identification, which necessitates the owner
driver’s data only. To hedge data dependency of previous
identification models, we leveraged Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN) which only requires the owner driver’s data
for training. GAN is composed of a generator creating fake
output, and discriminator classifying whether input data is real
or fake. GAN is commonly used to create artificial data with
the generator, but we used discriminator to classify whether
provided driving data is owner driver’s data (real) or not (fake).
We trained and evaluated GAN-based identification model
with test data set composed of four different drivers. Following
this research, our contributions are as follows:
1) Practicality: Our model does not require thief data at the
training stage. Thus, it can be applied as an automobile theft
detection method in the real world.
2) Economic Feasibility: As our model analyzes data ex-
tracted from CAN, we can simply extract data from the vehicle
without resource-consuming hardware installation.
3) Privacy: We designed a model which does not require
non-owner driver’s data for training; therefore, car manufactur-
ers can hedge the risk of privacy issue for commercialization.
4) Security: As our model is built by GAN, a black-
box model without using pre-defined ruleset; thus, malicious
intruders cannot figure out the driver identification logic easily.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Among numerous driver identification methods, data mining
method showed precise identification performance rather than
others. Following target data used in the analysis, previous
data mining methods are categorized as Table 1.
Data mining method started with simulated driving data. T.
Wakita et al. proposed driver identification method analyzing
observed behavior signals when a driver follows another
car. They collected data from driving simulator composed
of the steering wheel, pedals, and LCD monitor showing
driving scene. They identified multiple drivers with Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) [6]. Zhang et al. proposed a driver
identification model with Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
analyzing accelerator and steering wheel data. [7]. Above
researches showed data mining method with driving data can
identify drivers. But there exists a limitation that the simulated
environment is hard to reflect noises from the real world.
To reflect actual driving status, some researches proposed
driver identification model with mixed data from the real world
and simulator. Nishiwaki et al. collected data from embedded
sensors in a car, and built a driver identification model based
on driving characteristics illustrated in spectral features. They
focused behavioral signals such as brake pedal pressures.
Training data was collected by 276 drivers, using a specially
designed vehicle. Identification model with GMM resulted in
76.8% accuracy, showing the possibility of driver identification
with actual sensor data [10]. Although data mining with sensor
data established improvement, data collection process such as
device installation was resource-consumable. At the industry
level, it is not economic to bare cost for data collection
devices. Instead of resource-consuming physical sensor data,
researchers started to focus on CAN data. By embedding
cables to a car, it was much easier to collect driving data
from CAN.
Researchers actively utilized the convenience of CAN data.
Choi et al. collected CAN data from 9 drivers, applied
statistical methods on driver identification [11]. Although
accuracy was 25%, they showed CAN data analysis is a
feasible method with the lightweight data collection process.
Enev et al. collected CAN data at the parking lot and city road
from 15 different drivers, and achieved 100% accuracy with
ensembling machine learning algorithms [12]. Zhang et al.
proposed identification methods leveraging Deep Neural Net-
works (DNNs) [13]. They experimented various mixtures of
neural networks composed of Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) and Recurrent Networks such as LSTM (Long Short
Term Memory). From previous works, we recognized CAN
data contain meaningful features, and data mining method is
effective for driver identification.
In this work, we present the improved data mining method
for automobile theft countermeasure. Previous methods pre-
cisely identified many drivers, but it is only meaningful when
every driver’s data are trained. If unlabeled data is provided,
the model gets confused as it counters a new pattern which
does not exist in trained history. When we design automobile
theft countermeasure, it is impossible to collect and train
thief data to the model. Thus, the identification model should
classify unlabeled data as a thief without training. Then, the
model detects unknown patterns as thieves, and recognize
the trained pattern as the owner driver. We acknowledge
previous works are significant at the labeled data set, such
as co-owners of a family car. But they are inadequate to be
applied at automobile theft with unlabeled data. To overcome
this limitation, we suggest the driver identification model
only with owner driver’s data. To achieve this goal, Kang et
al. previously suggested driver identification method utilizing
clustering algorithms [15]. In this work, we leveraged RGAN
to provide a baseline model of automobile theft countermea-
sure which is applicable in the real world.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
A. Data Collection
We accumulated driving data from four different drivers
with a single vehicle, Hyundai YF Sonata to minimize noise
from vehicle difference. While a driver is driving along the
route illustrated in Fig. 1, we collected CAN data utilizing On
Board Diagnostic 2 (OBD-II) and CarbigsP as scanning tool to
extract data. Leveraging that OBD-II diagnoses status of ECUs
and return specific value of them, we accumulated driving data
with 51 features, recorded per second. At experimental driving,
four drivers drove along the route following traffic rules of
South Korea.
B. Feature Engineering
Feature engineering process eliminates potential defects at
model training. For better performance, we managed three
TABLE I: Researches on data mining methods for driver identification
Target Data Specific Data Type Identification Methodology Reference
Simulated Data Behavior Signals Statistical Algorithm [6]
Accelerator, Steering Wheels Statistical Algorithm [7]
Mixed Data Behavior Signals Statistical Algorithm [8]
Vehicle Sensors and Statistical Algorithm and [9]
Speech, Image, Location Signals Neural Networks
Sensor Data Embedded Physical Sensor Statistical Algorithm [10]
CAN Statistical Algorithm [11]
CAN Machine Learning Algorithm [12]
CAN Neural Network [13], [14]
Fig. 1: Driving route for data collection
Fig. 2: Visualized correlation matrix composed of 51 features
levels of feature engineering process: Exclusion of highly-
correlated features, filtering non-influential features, and slid-
ing window with normalization.
1) Exclusion of Highly-Correlated Features: Raw driv-
ing data contains 51 features, and some of these features
have a comparatively high level of correlation. When highly-
correlated features are provided into the model, they blur
unique characteristics of owner drivers driving pattern. Fol-
lowing experimental trials, we analyzed a pair of features
with the absolute value of correlation higher than 0.95 are
highly-correlated. Fig. 2 visualizes correlation matrix of 51
features selected from four owner drivers’ single trip data.
The darker color shows a high level of correlation, and lighter
color shows a low level of correlation. We excluded highly
correlated features and resulted in 32 essential features as
Table 2.
2) Filtering Non-Influential Features: Non-influential fea-
tures also blur identification model. As model interprets
distinguishable features through training, excluding features
without significant difference enhances model performance.
We excluded features fulfilling one of any statistical rules
presented below:
• Rule 1) Missing Value: Certain feature contains null value
throughout the driving.
• Rule 2) Feature Indifference: A value of certain feature
is indifferent at each driver
• Rule 3) Feature Invariance: Aggregated value of certain
feature is zero and the standard deviation of that feature
is also zero at each driver.
Features satisfying Rule 1) implicate the existence of error
during the data extraction process, thus we dropped them.
Rule 2) proposes the feature does not imply any distinct
characteristics among drivers. As indifferent features can blur
the detection model, we also eliminated features fulfilling Rule
2). Lastly, Rule 3) implies the existence of data extraction
error. If an unknown error happens during the data extraction
process, we checked OBD-II records consistent zero value.
We dropped features fulfilling the third rule to minimize data
extraction error.
3) Sliding Window with Normalization: To transform raw
data into the trainable form, we performed window sliding.
We set 33 seconds as the fixed length of time window. By
sliding time window through a trip time, we created multiple
training data. We normalized all training data employing the
following equation below, letting different scales of features
ranged in a specific boundary.
Xnormalized =
Xi −Min(Xi)
Max(Xi)−Min(Xi)
TABLE II: Essential features from CAN bus data
Category Features
Fuel Fuel consumption, Short term fuel trim bank, Long term fuel trim bank,
Intake air pressure, Engine fuel cut off, Decreased fuel cut off
Engine Engine speed, Current spark timing, Engine coolant temperature,
Target engine idle speed, Maximum engine torque, Minimum engine torque,
Calculated LOAD value, Standard torque ratio, Engine torque cutoff,
Engine speed increase
Transmission Friction torque, Torque converter speed, Current gear level,
Transmission oil temperature, Torque converter turbine speed, Converter clutch,
Gear choice, Steering wheel speed, Steering wheel angle,
Front-left wheel speed, Front-right wheel speed,
Rear-left wheel speed, Rear-right wheel speed
Misc. Car speed, Brake switch, Road gradient
C. Algorithm: Recurrent Generative Adversarial Network
We set GAN as classification algorithm. GAN is deep
neural networks comprised of two objects: Generator and
Discriminator. The generator creates realistic data to deceive
discriminator, while the discriminator classifies whether input
data is real or fake. By composing original GAN, numerous
derived GAN models have been proposed following which
type of data to train [16]. Acknowledging driving data has tem-
poral dynamics as time-series movement, we used Recurrent
Generative Adversarial Networks (RGAN) which generator
and discriminator are composed in Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNN) architecture. As numerous works have proved RNN
performs well with time-series movement, we expect RGAN
learns driving data effectively.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the identification model consists of
RNN-LSTM to hedge vanishing gradient problem of RNN.
Generator receives randomly distributed noise and return
fake time-series driving data. Discriminator receives both real
training data and generated fake data to compute probability
whether data is real or not. Through experimental trials, we
optimized discriminator and generator with Gradient descent
optimizer and Adam optimizer, respectively. We also observed
the generator requires more iteration of training rather than
discriminator, consuming more effort to the deceive discrim-
inator. We trained the owner driver’s data and evaluated the
performance of trained discriminator at the test set.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULT
A. Experiment setup
We performed an experiment with four different drivers
labeled as driver A, B, C, D, and picked one driver as owner
and others as thieves. If driver A is selected as the owner,
B, C and D are labeled as thieves. The training set is only
composed of owner driver’s driving data, and test set consists
of both owner driver and thief drivers. We formally expected
automobile theft rarely occurs during the car’s life cycle, thus
composed test set following ratio of 8:2 for owner and thief
drivers respectively. The average time length of the training
set is 1986 seconds. Thus, the model learned owner driver’s
pattern during 33 minutes of driving.
B. Evaluation
We set a goal of proposed model as detecting the occurrence
of automobile theft. Thus, we defined false positive error and
the false negative error as below:
• False Positive Error: Identify thieves as the owner driver
• False Negative Error: Identify the owner driver as thieves
We evaluated detection performance with four metrics:
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score. Accuracy is a ratio of
correctly identified result to the total identification results, and
it provides the most intuitive performance evaluation. As test
sets are not distributed in symmetric way, we considered other
evaluation criteria for accurate evaluation. Precision is the
ratio of correct identification results to the total identification
results. High precision shows the low false positive error,
implicating thieves are not identified as the owner driver.
Recall is the ratio of correct identification to all of actual
labels. High recall implicates the low false negative error that
owner drivers are not identified as thieves. Lastly, F1 score is
the weighted average value of precision and recall, considering
both false positive error and false negative error. Following
four evaluation metrics, Table 3 shows the experiment result.
Trained model recognized the owner driver well with rea-
sonable accuracy, and the result shows lower recall com-
pared to precision. In the viewpoint of security and safety,
we allowed this low recall. Both false positive error and
false negative error at theft detection are critical to driver
experience. Low precision with high false positive error can
cause a security problem, which brings direct loss of asset.
Low recall with high false negative error generates a usabil-
ity problem, that the owner driver gets annoyed from false
theft detection. In this research, we prioritized security rather
than usability. We analyzed the first and foremost goal of
theft countermeasure is securing a valuable asset, the car.
As false positive errors are hard to be mitigated, thus we
decided proposed models should have high precision to reduce
serious damage toward the asset. On the other hand, other
authentication modules can supplement to recognize misplaced
owner driver, then false negative errors are relatively tolerable.
To hedge the fatal situation from such security problems,
we designed the model to minimize false positive error. We
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Fig. 3: Driver identification model with RGAN
TABLE III: Driver identification experiment result
Driver Training set Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
A 1930s 0.891 0.913 0.738 0.788
B 2034s 0.862 0.796 0.741 0.763
C 2002s 0.892 0.94 0.73 0.783
D 1978s 0.894 0.846 0.808 0.824
Average 1986s 0.884 0.873 0.754 0.789
evaluate the proposed model suggests a stable baseline for
owner driver identification only with owner driver’s data. From
this baseline, applying supplementary methods discussed in
the Discussion section would create theft countermeasure with
reduced usability problem.
V. USE CASE SCENARIO
1) Implementation: Our detection method can be devel-
oped as an independent application on automotive operating
systems. As a benchmark case, previous research suggested
driver identification application on Automotive Grade Linux
[17]. Similarly, we expect our theft detection application can
be implemented on IVI, and provide User Interface (UI) to
the owner driver. This application at IVI enables the owner
driver to start training stage of theft detection model. Under
authenticated circumstances such as right after the purchase
of the new car, the owner driver can initiate data collection to
create training set.
2) Model training: Leveraging that OBD-II can send CAN
data via Bluetooth communication, our application would
collect CAN data easily. Following the experiment setup, our
model necessitates at least 30 minutes of driving data as a
training set. From training data collected from OBD-II, our
application learns the driving pattern of the owner driver. If
computing power at the given automotive environment is not
enough, our application can send training set to the indepen-
dent server through telematics channel. Then, the server with
enough computing power trains detection model, and send the
trained model back to the vehicle.
3) Real-time detection: After the training stage, the trained
model performs real-time theft detection for every validation
data created through the driving. The proposed method utilizes
the fixed time window of 33 seconds; thus our model per-
forms real-time detection for validation data with 33 seconds
of length. When theft is detected, the application sends a
notification to the owner driver through text message to the
owner driver. If the owner driver answers that theft is actually
happened, application notifies the occurrence of theft to appro-
priate authorities such as police or car manufacturers. In case
of urgent situations, the application would let Advanced Driver
Assistance System (ADAS) to lock the car door and ring
theft alarms. If the owner driver answers that theft detection
was wrong, application accumulates these wrong detection
results as an additional training set, and re-train the model
for sustainable maintenance of detection model.
4) Comparative advantage: The key advantage of our
baseline model is generality, that our detection model can
be easily applied to common cars. Previous works showed
the possibility of theft detection leveraging various devices.
For example, car manufacturers would utilize in-car cameras
at theft detection, which was originally designed to check
whether the driver is paying attention. However, past methods
necessitate additional sensors such as a camera. Therefore,
they cannot be applied to old cars which are not compat-
ible with additional modules. Moreover, the installation of
additional sensor creates economic burden toward car man-
ufacturers. Compared to previous methods, our theft detection
model can be applied to common cars as CAN is boarded
in most cars. Furthermore, our model can be implemented
without installing additional sensors. Thus, car manufactures
do not have much burden of installation cost. Based on these
key advantages, we analyzed our proposed method can be
improved with further research effort, which is elaborated in
the following section.
VI. DISCUSSION
1) Improving detection performance with ensembling: En-
sembling different method would provide more accurate theft
detection performance. As both false positive error and false
negative error of theft detection should be mitigated, additional
authentication methods would supplement proposed baseline
model. For instance, device pairing authentication method
would mingle well with proposed model by reducing false
negative error. Embedded pairing module authenticates driver
when the registered device is paired. As people carry electronic
devices such as smartphone, pairing information is highly
applicable in daily circumstances. If the module is paired, our
model can adjust the identification result reflecting result of
device authentication. With collaborative driver identification,
our model can provide enhanced performance enough to be
used in the real world.
2) Theft detection at various driving circumstances: Our
proposed model can be enhanced by considering various
circumstances. First, our model shall be trained to recognize
multiple co-owners for a single car. Our experiment assumed
a case that there is a single owner driver for a single car.
However, there frequently exists multiple co-owners in a real
world. In the case of a family car, our detection model
should not identify family members as thieves. Therefore, it
is necessary to enhance our detection method to recognize
multiple legitimate owner drivers. Furthermore, the proposed
method can be validated at different road conditions such as
highways or parking lots. Lastly, for the better applicability,
we will improve our proposed method to use smaller size of
training data.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose automobile theft countermea-
sure utilizing driver identification method. Past data mining
methods identified driving patterns well, but there existed an
obstacle that it only identifies labeled data. Due to the hardness
of collecting thief data, identification model should identify
the owner driver well with unlabeled data. To hurdle over this
problem, we employ RGAN which only requires the owner
driver’s data. The proposed model learned owner driver’s
driving characteristics, and recognized the owner driver from
thieves with reasonable performance.
Our automobile theft countermeasure suggests meaningful
contributions. First and foremost, the model only requires the
owner driver’s data and classifies any abnormal driving pattern
as a thief. Our model analyzes CAN data, thus accompanies
lightweight data collection process. As it only necessitates
the owner’s data, we can also hedge data privacy problem.
Finally, our countermeasure is hard to be neutralized as RGAN
is a black-box model. We expect collaborative identification
with supplementary authentication methods enhances result
precisely. In pursuit of precise automobile theft countermea-
sure, we will further research on driver identification at various
driving circumstances with RGAN.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by Samsung Research Funding
& Incubation Center for Future Technology under Project
Number SRFC-TB1403-51.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham,
S. Savage, K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, T. Kohno et al.,
“Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces.”
in USENIX Security Symposium, vol. 4. San Francisco, 2011, pp. 447–
462.
[2] J. Menn, “Security experts hack into moving car and seize
control,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-hacking/
security-experts-hack-into-moving-car-and-seize-control-idUSKCN0PV29X20150721,
2015, [Online; Last Access 8 May 2019].
[3] M. Villa, M. Gofman, and S. Mitra, “Survey of biometric techniques for
automotive applications,” in Information Technology-New Generations.
Springer, 2018, pp. 475–481.
[4] N. M. A. P. S. Nimbhorkar, “A survey paper on continuous authen-
tication by multimodal biometric,” International Journal of Advanced
Research in Computer Engineering & Technology (IJARCET), vol. 4,
no. 11, 2015.
[5] S. Meyer, “Security experts hack into moving car and
seize control,” https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/
connected-vehicles-are-commuters-in-the-privacy-driving-seat, 2018,
[Online; Last Access 1 May 2019].
[6] T. Wakita, K. Ozawa, C. Miyajima, K. Igarashi, K. Itou, K. Takeda,
and F. Itakura, “Driver identification using driving behavior signals,”
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems, vol. 89, no. 3, pp.
1188–1194, 2006.
[7] X. Zhang, X. Zhao, and J. Rong, “A study of individual characteris-
tics of driving behavior based on hidden markov model,” Sensors &
Transducers, vol. 167, no. 3, p. 194, 2014.
[8] C. Miyajima, Y. Nishiwaki, K. Ozawa, T. Wakita, K. Itou, K. Takeda, and
F. Itakura, “Driver modeling based on driving behavior and its evaluation
in driver identification,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 95, no. 2, pp.
427–437, 2007.
[9] A. Wahab, C. Quek, C. K. Tan, and K. Takeda, “Driving profile modeling
and recognition based on soft computing approach,” IEEE transactions
on neural networks, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 563–582, 2009.
[10] Y. Nishiwaki, K. Ozawa, T. Wakita, C. Miyajima, K. Itou, and K. Takeda,
“Driver identification based on spectral analysis of driving behavioral
signals,” in Advances for In-Vehicle and Mobile Systems. Springer,
2007, pp. 25–34.
[11] S. Choi, J. Kim, D. Kwak, P. Angkititrakul, and J. H. Hansen, “Analysis
and classification of driver behavior using in-vehicle can-bus informa-
tion,” in Biennial workshop on DSP for in-vehicle and mobile systems,
2007, pp. 17–19.
[12] M. Enev, A. Takakuwa, K. Koscher, and T. Kohno, “Automobile driver
fingerprinting,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, vol.
2016, no. 1, pp. 34–50, 2016.
[13] J. Zhang, Z. Wu, F. Li, C. Xie, T. Ren, J. Chen, and L. Liu, “A deep
learning framework for driving behavior identification on in-vehicle can-
bus sensor data,” Sensors, vol. 19, no. 6, p. 1356, 2019.
[14] B. I. Kwak, J. Woo, and H. K. Kim, “Know your master: Driver
profiling-based anti-theft method,” in 2016 14th Annual Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust (PST). IEEE, 2016, pp. 211–218.
[15] Y. G. Kang, K. H. Park, and H. K. Kim, “Automobile theft detection
by clustering owner driver data,” escar Europe, 2019.
[16] C. Esteban, S. L. Hyland, and G. Ra¨tsch, “Real-valued (medical)
time series generation with recurrent conditional gans,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1706.02633, 2017.
[17] A. El Mekki, A. Bouhoute, and I. Berrada, “Improving driver identi-
fication for the next generation of in-vehicle software systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2019.
